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“Is this maybe just hopeful thinking? Are we perhaps coming to 
a point where litigation requirements and business practices 
and best practices can become one and the same?” 
–Judge James D. Walker, Jr., Public Comment on Proposed 
Changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2005. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Nothing surprises us anymore when it comes to the world 
of electronic discovery. Legion are the tales of over-reaching 
discovery requests, terabyte productions, and astronomical 
production costs. The 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure were supposed to change all that. After all, 
weren’t the amended rules designed to streamline the discovery 
process, allowing parties to focus on substantive issues while 
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making discovery costs more reasonable?1 Instead, it seems the 
rules have spawned more collateral discovery disputes than 
ever before about preservation and production issues. Is it any 
wonder that many are questioning whether the so-called ESI 
amendments2 are living up to their billing?3 
Despite the overall shortcomings of the amendments, one 
rule is helping to clarify preservation and production burdens 
for electronically stored information: Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37(e).4 Rule 37(e) provides refuge from sanctions for 
spoliation of evidence when electronically stored information 
has been destroyed pursuant to the routine, good faith 
operation of an electronic information system.5 Put in layman’s 
terms, litigants may avoid sanctions even though their 
computer servers delete e-mail and other electronic data 
according to the server’s programmed operation.6 This so-called 
“Safe Harbor” is only available when the “routine operation” is 
carried out in “good faith” such that relevant data is retained 
after a preservation duty attaches.7 
                                                          
 1. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 22–24 
*2005) [hereinafter REPORT] available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf. 
 2. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note (2006 Amendment to 
subdivision (a)) (generally describing computer-generated material as 
“electronically stored information” or ESI). 
 3. See Mary Mack, Total Revamp of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?, 
DISCOVERYRESOURCES.ORG, Apr. 9, 2005, 
http://www.discoveryresources.org/library/case-law-and-rules/total-revamp-of-
federal-rules-of-civil-procedure/. 
 4. Originally enacted as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(f), an overall 
restyling of the Federal Rules in December 2007 caused it to be re-numbered 
as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e). Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory 
committee’s note (2006 Amendment) (explaining the operation of the new ESI 
rule), with STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL CIVIL RULES HANDBOOK 
2008 803 (2007) (explaining how the 2007 amendments renumbered the rules). 
 5. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); see KCH Serv., Inc. v. Vanaire, Inc., No. 05-777-
C, 2009 WL 2216601, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Jul. 22, 2009). 
 6. See Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093FMCJCX, 
2007 WL 2080419, at *13–14 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007) (holding the Safe 
Harbor insulated defendants from sanctions despite their failure to retain 
data stored in the random access memory of their computers), aff’d, 245 F.R.D. 
443 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
 7. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note (2006 Amendment); 
Ripley v. District of Columbia, No. 06-1705 (EGS), slip op. at 9 (D.D.C. Jul. 2, 
2009) (holding Rule 37(e) would not shield defendants from monetary 
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As first proposed and enacted, the Safe Harbor was 
championed as a protection against absurd preservation 
obligations.8 The rule would allow “corporate America,” along 
with governments, universities, and others, to safely eliminate 
electronic materials that did not have business value.9 And this 
policy in turn would reduce operating costs associated with 
data retention.10 At the same time, organizations would 
maintain electronically stored information pertinent to 
litigation.11 
Now that Rule 37(e) has been in place for three years, it is 
worth examining whether the Safe Harbor has lived up to this 
billing. The transition from concept to rule has not been 
seamless.12 The Safe Harbor has been subject to criticism from 
a number of attorneys and legal scholars.13 It has also caused 
some confusion with respect to when a party should suspend its 
computer system to preserve relevant information.14 On the 
other hand, the new rule and its progeny of case law have 
provided guidance to organizations in preparing records 
                                                          
sanctions given their failure to operate their e-mail system in good faith); 
MeccaTech, Inc. v. Kiser, No. 8:05CV570, 2008 WL 6010937, at *9 (D. Neb. 
Apr. 2, 2008) (finding that Rule 37(e) was not applicable given defendants’ 
intentional destruction or withholding of electronic data). 
 8. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PUBLIC HEARING ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 93–94, 147–48, 365–72 (Feb. 11, 
2005) [hereinafter PUBLIC HEARING] available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery/CVHearingFeb2005.pdf; Thomas Y. 
Allman, The Case for a Preservation Safe Harbor in Requests for E-Discovery, 
70 DEF. COUNS. J. 417 (2003). 
 9. See PUBLIC HEARING, supra note 8, at 369–70; REPORT, supra note 1, 
at app. C-83. 
 10. See PUBLIC HEARING, supra note 8, at 369–70. 
 11. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note (2006 Amendment); C.f. 
Gippetti v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. C07-00812 RMW (HRL), 2008 WL 
3264483, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2008) (denying discovery sanctions where the 
defendant had no reason to think that certain information purged pursuant to 
a routine data destruction system was relevant to discovery). 
 12. See REPORT, supra note 1, at app. F-7–8 (listing pros and cons of 
adopting the new rule). 
 13. See id.; PUBLIC HEARING, supra note 8, at 25–26 (asking critical 
questions about the new rule); Daniel Renwick Hodgman, A Port in the 
Storm?: The Problematic and Shallow Safe Harbor for Electronic Discovery, 
101 NW. U. L. REV. 259, 282 (2007) (expressing ambivalence about the 
adequacy of the Safe Harbor). 
 14. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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retention policies.15 While not causing a sea change, Rule 37(e) 
is moving records management beyond the status quo. 
Organizations are receiving guidance on how to bring their 
policies in line with litigation requirements. 
This Article will consider these subjects in the following 
pages. Part II of this Article will delve into the background, 
text and purpose of the Safe Harbor as they relate to document 
management and preservation. It will also describe the 
intermediate standard for imposing sanctions that was crafted 
in connection with Rule 37(e). Part III will review key case law 
that has evolved since the implementation of Rule 37(e). It will 
additionally detail some best practices for records management 
derived from those decisions. In Part IV, this Article will 
describe some suggestions that litigants may follow to 
implement these best practices. 
II.  RULE 37(e)PROMOTING BEST PRACTICES FOR 
RECORDS MANAGEMENT IN LITIGATION 
To understand why Rule 37(e) is helping companies with 
their document management efforts, it is worth exploring the 
background of the rule itself, along with its text and the 
corresponding Advisory Committee Note. This part will analyze 
why cases issued before the promulgation of Rule 37(e) were 
limited in their capacity to develop cogent e-discovery 
principles. It will also show that only a uniform national 
standard could provide needed clarity so litigants could 
confidently implement document retention protocols. 
A.  BACKGROUND GIVING RISE TO RULE 37(e) 
The Safe Harbor has its origins in case law that began to 
develop in the mid-to late-1990s as e-mail and other electronic 
information became ubiquitous.16 Decisions issued by scattered 
jurisdictions in the ensuing years described parties’ 
preservation obligations with respect to computer data. The 
reasoning from those decisions seemed to provide guidance on 
                                                          
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. The principles regarding preservation inherent in Rule 37(e) may be 
traced back to analogous decisions addressing productions of paper 
documents. See, e.g., Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73 (D. 
Mass. 1976) (affirming default judgment sanction for defendant’s refusal to 
address its problematic document retention system). 
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which litigants—particularly organizations generating large 
amounts of data—could rely to develop reasonable retention 
policies. 
1.  No Duty to Preserve All Electronically Stored Information 
In Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., it was held that 
companies had no duty to preserve all of their e-mail 
communications.17 Keeping every single e-mail could not be a 
workable standard, even if all such e-mail was arguably 
pertinent to future litigation.18 Such a burden would expose 
litigants to cost prohibitive and impractical preservation 
requirements.19 Similar logic is found in Zubulake v. UBS 
Warburg LLC, which reasoned that an organization’s 
operations would be “crippled” if it were forced to retain all of 
its paper and electronic data.20 
This view also found support in professional journals21 and 
academic scholarship22 published before the enactment of Rule 
37(e).23 Given the burdens associated with data preservation, it 
was even posited that relevant data should not be preserved 
until the issuance of an applicable discovery order.24 
                                                          
 17. Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 
33352759, at *4–5 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997). 
 18. Id. at *4. 
 19. Id. at *5. 
 20. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 
WL 22439865, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2003) (“A party does not have to go to 
‘extraordinary measures’ to preserve all potential evidence . . . [i]t does not 
have to preserve every single scrap of paper in its business.”) (citing China 
Ocean Shipping (Group) Co. v. Simone Metals Inc., No. 97 C 2694, 1999 WL 
966443, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1999) and Danis v. USN Commc’ns, Inc., No. 
98 C 7482, 2000 WL 1694325, at *32 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2000)). 
 21. See e.g., SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON BEST PRACTICES 
FOR ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT RETENTION & PRODUCTION, THE SEDONA 
PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR 
ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 20 (2004) (“At a minimum, 
organizations need not preserve every shred of paper, every e-mail or 
electronic document, and every backup tape.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Discovery 
Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 621, 623 (2001) (arguing that companies should not 
be required to maintain all electronic data as this would be impractical and 
cost prohibitive). 
 23. Id. at 624. 
 24. Id. Such a view finds little support in the case law that has developed 
since the enactment of Rule 37(e). See infra Part III. 
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2.  Relevant Information to Be Retained after Duty to Preserve 
Attaches 
Even though pre-Rule 37(e) case law did not require 
litigants to preserve all information, it typically expected them 
to maintain data once they knew or should reasonably have 
known such data would be relevant to anticipated or actual 
litigation.25 This standard seemed to apply regardless of the 
given circumstances of a particular case. On the one hand, a 
preservation duty could be triggered at the time an action 
begins.26 In Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., plaintiff’s 
filing of a complaint provided notice that relevant materials 
should be retained.27 On the other hand,  the duty to preserve 
in Inventory Locator Service, LLC v. PartsBase, Inc. did not 
arise until almost 16 months after the action commenced.28 In 
contrast to those cases, the obligation to preserve attached in 
E*Trade Securities LLC v. Deutsche Bank well before the 
complaint was filed since litigation was already anticipated by 
the parties at that time.29 
3.  Limited Guidance from Pre-Rule 37(e) Decisions 
Though helpful in giving some direction on data retention, 
the guidance provided by pre-Rule 37(e) case law was limited at 
best.30 The decisions in question were typically issued by trial 
courts and did not carry precedential value.31 Case holdings 
                                                          
 25. See, e.g., Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217–18; Wiginton, 2003 WL 
22439865, at *4. 
 26. Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 
33352759, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Inventory Locator Serv., LLC v. PartsBase, Inc., No. 02-2695-MaV, 
2005 WL 6062855, at *13 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 19, 2005). 
 29. E*Trade Sec. LLC v. Deutsche Bank, AG, 230 F.R.D. 582, 584 (D. 
Minn. 2005) (ordering sanctions against the defendant due to its systemic 
destruction of evidence after the duty to preserve was triggered). 
 30. See Robert Douglas Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the 
Stormy e-Discovery Seas, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 53, ¶ 29 (2004), at 
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v10i5/article53.pdf. 
 31. Id. But see Morris v. Union Pac. R.R., 373 F.3d 896, 905 (8th Cir. 
2004) (reversing adverse inference instruction where evidence had been 
destroyed pursuant to a routine document retention policy before a 
preservation duty attached); Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. 
Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that an adverse inference 
sanction may be imposed for negligent destruction of evidence). 
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were also frequently inconsistent,32 resulting in confusion for 
organizations trying to implement good faith retention 
practices.33 For example, different courts applied varying 
standards of culpability to determine whether sanctions were 
appropriate for litigants’ failure to preserve electronically 
stored information. The Second Circuit applied a negligence 
standard when issuing a negative inference jury instruction.34 
That meant litigants could be sanctioned if they knew or should 
have known that data they caused to be deleted would be 
relevant in litigation.35 In contrast, the Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits refused to do so absent a finding of bad faith and 
intentional misconduct.36 Still other jurisdictions required an 
intermediate standard before considering such a drastic 
measure.37 
Besides the inconsistencies, many decisions failed to 
appreciate that retention policies have a crucial impact on the 
success of an organization.38 Under such policies, organizations 
program their servers to catch phishing e-mails, quarantine 
suspected viruses, and block junk mail.39 Computer systems 
are also designed to archive and delete stale e-mail.40 By 
                                                          
 32. See REPORT, supra note 1, at 23. 
 33. Id.; see PUBLIC HEARING, supra note 8, at 371–72. 
 34. Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 108 (“The sanction of an adverse 
inference may be appropriate in some cases involving the negligent 
destruction of evidence because each party should bear the risk of its own 
negligence.”). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1413 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding 
that bad faith is a condition precedent to issuing an adverse inference 
instruction); Turner v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 563 F.3d 1136, 1149–50 (10th 
Cir. 2009) (“But if the aggrieved party seeks an adverse inference to remedy 
the spoliation, it must also prove bad faith.”); Bashir v. Amtrak, 119 F.3d 929, 
931 (11th Cir. 1997) (failing to preserve evidence will result in a negligent 
inference instruction upon a showing of bad faith); Phillips v. Aaron Rents, 
Inc., 262 F. App’x. 202, 210 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 37. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 747 (8th Cir. 
2004) (rejecting negligence standard and instead holding that “[T]here must 
be some indication of an intent to destroy the evidence for the purpose of 
obstructing or suppressing the truth in order to impose the sanction of an 
adverse inference instruction”); Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. 
Cos., Inc., 306 F.3d 806, 824 (9th Cir. 2002) (same). 
 38. See PUBLIC HEARING, supra note 8, at 369; Allman, supra note 8, at 
420. 
 39. PUBLIC HEARING, supra note 8, at 369. 
 40. Id.; REPORT, supra note 1, at app. C-83. 
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preventing an influx of spam and by eliminating aged e-mails, 
open space is created on existing servers.41 This process, in 
turn, permits companies to reduce operating expenses since 
they are not obligated to expand server capacity to house data 
that has little or no business value.42 Issuing case-
determinative sanctions for pursuing best business practices—
particularly based on a negligence standard—arguably places 
an undue burden on companies.43 
Nevertheless, legal considerations—including litigation—
must play a part in the planning and implementation of 
retention policies.44 To ignore those considerations in 
fashioning and suspending automatic deletion protocols could 
expose an organization to liability even for the most reasonable 
discovery demands. How could these countervailing 
considerations be harmonized?45 
B.  RULE 37(e)’S EFFORT TO BALANCE CORPORATE AND 
LITIGATION IMPERATIVES 
1.  A Limited Safe Harbor Protects Litigants from Excessive 
Preservation Obligations 
The answer was a limited Safe Harbor.46 As envisioned by 
the Advisory Committee, the Safe Harbor would shield 
organizations from sanctions when data was “lost as a result of 
the routine, good faith operation of an electronic information 
system.”47 In its Judicial Conference Report, the Advisory 
Committee took pains to emphasize the unreasonable burdens 
that parties would face without the Safe Harbor.48 Indeed, it 
                                                          
 41. PUBLIC HEARING, supra note 8, at 369. 
 42. See Redish, supra note 22, at 623. These same considerations apply to 
data stored on back-up tapes for archival or disaster recovery purposes. See 
also PUBLIC HEARING, supra note 8, at 369. 
 43. See REPORT, supra note 1, at app. C-84. 
 44. Phillip M. Adams & Assoc., L.L.C. v. Dell, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 
1193 (D. Utah 2009); Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73 (D. 
Mass. 1976). 
 45. See Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 
614, 623. (D. Colo. 2007) (explaining that parties often face an “intractable 
dilemma: either preserve voluminous records for a [sic] indefinite period at 
potentially great expense, or continue routine document management 
practices and risk a spoliation claim at some point in the future”). 
 46. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 47. Id. 
 48. REPORT, supra note 1, at app. C-83. 
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appeared the Committee was marching lockstep with the 
business community’s view that the Safe Harbor was the 
answer to their document preservation problems.49 For 
example, if companies were required to suspend their retention 
policies at the moment litigation was anticipated, the upsurge 
in retained data could overwhelm many computer systems.50 It 
is also questionable whether such data would be relevant in 
litigation.51 As a result, the Advisory Committee concluded that 
it would be “[u]nrealistic to expect parties to stop such routine 
operation of their computer systems as soon as they reasonably 
anticipate litigation.”52 
Thus, it appeared that companies could continue using 
their records management policies to rid themselves of 
unwanted data without being sanctioned. This general rule was 
subject to certain exceptions, of course.53 But the point for 
organizations was that courts would now be forced to examine a 
litigant’s document retention protocols through more than just 
the lens of litigation. Courts—at least in theory—would have to 
consider the nature and motives behind a company’s decision-
making process. Organizations might finally have a fighting 
chance in court.54 
2.  The Safe Harbor Does Not Insulate Organizations from 
Reasonable Litigation Demands 
While the Safe Harbor provided some key protections to 
corporate America, the new rule also addressed some of the 
lingering concerns from the plaintiffs’ bar.55 The Safe Harbor 
only applied to data that was destroyed due to the ordinary 
                                                          
 49. PUBLIC HEARING, supra note 8, at 365–72. 
 50. REPORT, supra note 1, at app. C-83; Redish, supra note 22, at 623. 
 51. REPORT, supra note 1, at app. C-83. 
 52. Id. at app. C-83, F-7. 
 53. See infra Part III. 
 54. Thomas Y. Allman, Defining Culpability: The Search for a Limited 
Safe Harbor in Electronic Discovery, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 65, 83 (2007) (“[B]y 
assuring public and private entities, both large and small, that common sense 
will be applied to the review of their preservation decisions, it should help 
break the logjam for those that have desired, but hesitated, to implement 
realistic and balanced policies and procedures to meet their business and 
litigation needs.”). 
 55. PUBLIC HEARING, supra note 8, at 25–26 (arguing that a prior draft of 
the Safe Harbor seemed to “encourage the destruction rather than the 
retention” of data). 
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functions of a computer system.56 It did not prevent sanctions 
when data was manually deleted.57 For example, the Safe 
Harbor afforded no protection to a company that relied on its 
individual employees to manually archive and delete electronic 
data.58 Nor could it shelter bad faith data destruction,59 such as 
intentionally deleting database information,60 e-mails,61 web 
pages,62 metadata,63 software,64 data on hardware65 or other 
records once the duty to preserve attached.66 
The Safe Harbor would also yield in other “exceptional 
circumstances.”67 An organization could be required to modify 
certain aspects of a retention policy once a preservation duty 
was triggered.68 Companies could not simply allow their 
                                                          
 56. The Safe Harbor does not apply to the destruction of paper documents. 
See Phillip M. Adams & Assoc., L.L.C. v. Dell, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1191 
(D. Utah 2009); FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note (2006 
Amendment). 
 57. See Phillip M. Adams, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1192. 
 58. Id.; Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1376–77 (N.D. 
Cal. 2008). 
 59. Keithley v. Home Store.com, Inc., No. C-03-04447 SI (EDL), 2008 WL 
3833384, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2008). 
 60. Id., at *11. 
 61. Pandora Jewelry, LLC v. Chamilia, LLC, No. CCB-06-3041, 2008 WL 
4533902, at *8–9 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2008) (holding the Safe Harbor did not 
apply since defendant was grossly negligent for failing to preserve e-mail). 
 62. Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 409, 430–36 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that the Safe Harbor did not insulate defendants 
from adverse inference sanction where they failed to preserve relevant web 
pages after a preservation duty was triggered). 
 63. See Philip J. Favro, A New Frontier in Electronic Discovery: Preserving 
and Obtaining Metadata, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 20 (2007). 
 64. KCH Serv., Inc. v. Vanaire, Inc., No. 05-777-C, 2009 WL 2216601, at 
*1 (W.D. Ky. Jul. 22, 2009) (holding the Safe Harbor would not protect 
defendants from an adverse inference sanction given their deletion of software 
and their unreasonable failure to keep other electronic data after the duty to 
preserve attached). 
 65. Stratienko v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hosp. Auth., No. 1:07-
CV-258, 2009 WL 2168717, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Jul. 16, 2009) (holding that 
defendants’ re-imaging of hard drive after duty to preserve attached fell 
outside the scope of the Safe Harbor). 
 66. In re Krause, 367 B.R. 740, 766–68 (D. Kan. 2007) (holding that 
defendants’ use of a wiping software was not protected under the Safe 
Harbor); Nucor v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 204 (D.S.C. 2008) (ordering sanctions 
for defendant’s destruction of a USB flash drive). 
 67. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 68. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note (2006 Amendment) 
(“Good faith in the routine operation of an information system may involve a 
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computer systems to destroy relevant data at the same time 
they obliterated useless information.69 A litigant’s action or 
inaction on this issue would undoubtedly bear on whether the 
operation of its computer systems had been in good faith.70 
This has certainly turned out to be true. Most courts 
applying Rule 37(e) have issued sanctions for spoliation when a 
party has failed to suspend particular aspects of its computer 
systems after a preservation duty attached.71 Thus, the 
Advisory Committee did impose a duty to stop the routine 
destruction of electronic data in certain circumstances despite 
its earlier misgivings about doing so.72 And though this duty 
did not extend to all data, it was broad enough to encompass 
materials considered relevant to perceived or pending 
litigation.73 
3.  The Safe Harbor Established an Intermediate Standard for 
Imposing Discovery Sanctions 
Despite some confusion regarding when a litigant’s 
preservation duty arose, the Advisory Committee was clear 
regarding the measure for imposing discovery sanctions.74 The 
                                                          
party’s intervention to modify or suspend certain features of that routine 
operation to prevent the loss of information, if that information is subject to a 
preservation obligation.”). 
 69. Id.; see Peskoff v. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54, 60 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 70. See Disability Rights Council of Greater Wash. v. Wash. Metro. 
Transit Auth., 242 F.R.D. 139, 146 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 71. See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 409, 
430–36 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); cases cited infra Part III.C.1. But see Escobar v. City 
of Houston, No. 04-1945, 2007 WL 2900581, at *19 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2007) 
(holding the Safe Harbor protected defendant from sanctions despite 
neglecting to suspend the overwriting features to its electronic 
communications server). 
 72. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note (2006 Amendment) (“The 
good faith requirement of Rule 37[e] means that a party is not permitted to 
exploit the routine operation of an information system to thwart discovery 
obligations by allowing that operation to continue in order to destroy specific 
stored information that it is required to preserve.”). The Advisory Committee’s 
confusing statements on this issue seem to evince its position that “there is 
considerable uncertainty as to whether a party—particularly a party that 
produces large amounts of information—nonetheless has to interrupt the 
operation of the electronic information systems it is using to avoid any loss of 
information because of the possibility that it might be sought in discovery, or 
risk severe sanctions.” REPORT, supra note 1, at app. C-83. 
 73. Id.; see infra Part III.B. 
 74. REPORT, supra note 1, at app. C-83. 
FAVRO LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2010  1:13 PM 
2010] 37(e) SAFE HARBOR 329 
 
Committee deemed an intermediate standard best suited for 
determining whether sanctions should issue for data lost as the 
result of a computer system’s operation.75 
The intermediate benchmark resulted from a compromise 
between two competing proposals in the original draft rule. As 
initially designed, the proposed rule would have imposed 
sanctions based on a negligence standard.76 In an effort to 
balance this provision, the Advisory Committee alternatively 
proposed that sanctions be imposed for reckless or intentional 
conduct.77 
Each proposal, however, was sharply criticized for its 
shortcomings.78 The negligence standard was attacked since it 
essentially afforded no protection from sanctions than that 
already developed by case law.79 Indeed, it was worse than the 
status quo because a litigant could arguably be punished for 
“any mistake in interrupting the routine operation of a 
computer system.”80 For instance, a party could possibly be 
sanctioned for failing to suspend a records management policy 
despite preserving an alternative source of that deleted data.81 
In contrast, the intentional standard was considered too 
lenient; sanctions might not issue for genuinely nefarious 
conduct.82 Moreover, it might be too difficult for litigants to 
                                                          
 75. Id. (“The present proposal establishes an intermediate standard, 
protecting against sanctions if the information was lost in the ‘good faith’ 
operation of an electronic information system.”). 
 76. Id., at app. C-84; see Inventory Locator Serv., LLC v. PartsBase, Inc., 
No. 02-2695-MaV, 2005 WL 6062855, at *13 n.8 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 19, 2005) 
(finding support in the earlier version of Rule 37(e) that defendant’s 
preservation duty did not attach until nearly sixteen months after the action 
was commenced); Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 223 F.R.D. 162, 
177 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing to the early draft version of Rule 37(e) as support 
for its holding that no sanctions should issue for data destruction). 
 77. REPORT, supra note 1, at app. C-84. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.; see Escobar v. City of Houston, Civil Action No. 04-1945, 2007 WL 
2900581, at *19 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2007) (refusing to order sanctions for 
destruction of electronic data where alternative source of requested evidence 
was produced in discovery). 
 81. REPORT, supra note 1, at app. C-84; see Gippetti v. United Parcel 
Serv., Inc., No. C07-00812 RMW (HRL), 2008 WL 3264483, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 6, 2008); Escobar, 2007 WL 2900581, at *18–19; Healthcare Advocates, 
Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627, 641 (E.D. Pa. 
2007). 
 82. REPORT, supra note 1, at app. C-84. 
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establish the necessary intent for sanctions to issue under such 
a standard.83 
Ultimately, an intermediate standard, with the touchstone 
of “good faith,” became the operative benchmark under Rule 
37(e).84 Though its criteria were somewhat nebulous, a good 
faith standard would ultimately provide courts with leeway to 
appropriately balance a litigant’s conduct under the 
circumstances of a case.85 Such an approach resembled the 
manner in which the Eighth Circuit previously decided 
Stevenson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.86 and Morris v. Union 
Pacific Railroad.87 
In Stevenson, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a negative 
inference instruction issued by the trial court.88 That sanction 
was ordered for defendant Union Pacific’s destruction of 
recorded voice radio communications between railroad 
dispatchers and the crew of a train that had just struck 
plaintiff’s vehicle.89 The taped conversation had been erased 
prior to the commencement of litigation pursuant to 
defendant’s policy of reusing voice tapes by overwriting their 
contents after ninety days.90 Though erased several months 
prior to litigation, the court held that evidence of the 
communications should have been maintained.91 The tape was 
the only source of evidence reflecting the observations the train 
crew made just after the accident occurred.92 Moreover, the 
defendant had kept similar voice tapes in other circumstances 
when the tapes would absolve the company of liability.93 And 
                                                          
 83. Id.; see Morris v. Union Pac. R.R., 373 F.3d 896, 902–03 (8th Cir. 
2004) (describing the difficulty in establishing intent). 
 84. REPORT, supra note 1, at app. C-85. But see Keithley v. Home 
Store.com, Inc., No. C-03-04447 SI (EDL), 2008 WL 3833384, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 12, 2008) (declaring that violations of Rule 37 may invite sanctions even 
for negligent conduct). 
 85. See United Med. Supply v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 257, 269–70 
(2007) (noting that, among other things, Rule 37(e) was causing courts to 
reconsider “enhanced proof requirements . . . in favor of a flexible intent 
requirement”). 
 86. Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 87. Morris v. Union Pac. R.R., 373 F.3d 896 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 88. Stevenson, 354 F.3d at 747–48. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 747. 
 91. Id. at 748. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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though no effort was made to keep the tape, the defendant 
ensured that other, possibly exculpatory evidence was 
preserved.94 Such details confirmed that defendant’s conduct 
was intentional and negated its showing that destruction of the 
tape was in good faith.95 
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Morris vacated an 
adverse inference instruction in a strikingly similar case.96 Like 
Stevenson, Morris involved a plaintiff who had been injured in 
a train collision.97 And just as in Stevenson, Union Pacific had 
allowed a taped conversation between a train crew and railroad 
dispatchers to be erased in connection with its ninety-day 
retention policy.98 Regardless, the Eighth Circuit found an 
adverse inference instruction was not appropriate.99 Unlike 
Stevenson, it concluded that Union Pacific did not intentionally 
eliminate the taped conversation.100 Nor was there anything to 
suggest that some evidence was maintained while other, more 
crucial proof was destroyed.101 In the end, there was no 
evidence that belied the defendant’s good faith.102 
Though it reached opposite results in Stevenson and 
Morris, the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning is instructive. The court 
did not limit its analysis to merely determining whether or not 
information was eliminated by the routine operation of a 
computer system.103 Instead, it weighed various factors to glean 
the defendant’s intentions and decide whether sanctions were 
appropriate.104 In like manner, courts should evaluate the 
circumstances of a given matter to understand whether data 
was lost in good faith or not.105 
                                                          
 94. Id. at 747. 
 95. Id. at 747–48. 
 96. Morris v. Union Pac. R.R., 373 F.3d 896, 903 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 97. Id. at 898. 
 98. Id. at 899–900. 
 99. Id. at 902–03. 
 100. Id. at 902. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 902–03. 
 103. Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 748–49 (8th Cir. 
2004); Morris, 373 F.3d at 902. 
 104. Stevenson, 354 F.3d at 748–49; Morris, 373 F.3d at 902. 
 105. See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON ELECTRONIC 
DOCUMENT RETENTION & PRODUCTION, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE 
SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR 
ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 72 (Jonathan M. Redgrave 
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C.  A NATIONAL STANDARD FOR GUIDING RECORDS 
MANAGEMENT DECISIONS IN CONNECTION WITH LITIGATION 
As finalized, Rule 37(e) struck a balance between 
competing forces.106 On the one hand, the Safe Harbor could 
protect organizations from arbitrary retention obligations.107 
On the other hand, aggrieved parties could still seek relief for 
evidence destruction caused by bad faith, grossly negligent 
conduct, and ordinary negligence.108 A uniform benchmark had 
thus been established that could guide organizations’ choices 
for records management in connection with litigation.109 As 
discussed in Part Three, the resulting Safe Harbor 
jurisprudence would delineate some key trends that would 
further assist in this process. 
III.  KEY TRENDS FROM RULE 37(e) RECORDS 
MANAGEMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
In the years that have passed since Rule 37(e) was 
adopted, various courts have addressed the Safe Harbor. In 
very few instances have courts invoked the rule to shield 
parties from sanctions.110 Regardless of the final result, 
                                                          
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter 2007 SEDONA PRINCIPLES] (providing 
various suggestions for how courts can evaluate an organization’s good faith 
for purposes of applying Rule 37(e)); see also THE SEDONA CONFERENCE 
WORKING GROUP ON ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT RETENTION & PRODUCTION, THE 
SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY ON LEGAL 
HOLDS: THE TRIGGER & THE PROCESS 9–10 (Conor R. Crowley et al. eds., 2007) 
[hereinafter SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY ON LEGAL HOLDS] (listing 
factors to consider when determining whether litigation is “reasonably 
anticipated”). 
 106. See REPORT, supra note 1, at app. F-8. 
 107. See id. at app. C-83. 
 108. Pandora Jewelry, LLC v. Chamilia, LLC, No. CCB-06-3041, 2008 WL 
4533902, at *8 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2008). 
 109. Subject to certain conditions, courts may still issue sanctions 
independent of Rule 37(e) under their inherent authority. Escobar v. City of 
Houston, No. 04-1945, 2007 WL 2900581, at *17 n.5 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2007); 
Allman, supra note 54, at 14–15. 
 110. See, e.g., Sue v. Milyard, No. 07-cv-01711-REB-MJW, slip op. at 2 (D. 
Colo. Aug. 6, 2009), 2009 WL 2424435 (holding that the deleted video footage 
was destroyed pursuant to the “normal operating process of the camera’s 
computer system” before a preservation duty was triggered); Southeastern 
Mechanical Services, Inc. v. Brody, No. 8:08-CV-1151-T-30EAJ, slip op. at 3-4 
(M.D. Fla. July 24, 2009), 2009 WL 2242395 (finding in part that plaintiff had 
no duty to preserve certain backup tapes); Escobar, 2007 WL 2900581, at *17–
19 (holding that sanctions were not warranted where defendant preserved an 
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opinions interpreting Rule 37(e) have generated a number of 
helpful guidelines and trends. Such developments should be 
instructive for organizations as they look to streamline 
document retention policies with litigation requirements. Part 
Three will explore some of the principal developments that 
have occurred over the past three years and their pertinence to 
records management. 
A.  RECORDS MANAGEMENT STRATEGY MUST CONSIDER 
ACCOUNTABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES 
One of the principal advances in Safe Harbor jurisprudence 
is that records management policies must now consider an 
organization’s accountability to third parties.111 This is not a 
novel concept.112 It was previously considered in connection 
with disputes over preservation and production of paper 
documents.113 However, the extension of this doctrine to 
electronic data in Phillip M. Adams & Associates, L.L.C. v. 
Dell, Inc. was a significant development.114 
In Phillip M. Adams, the court issued sanctions in a patent 
infringement action for the defendants’ spoliation of source 
code, along with related documents and communications, after 
a preservation duty attached.115 As part of its holding, the court 
refused the defendants’ request to invoke the Safe Harbor given 
their failure to operate their computer systems in good faith.116 
In reaching this decision, the court zeroed in on the 
unreasonably narrow scope of the defendants’ retention 
                                                          
alternative source of the sought after evidence ); Columbia Pictures Indus. v. 
Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093FMCJCX, 2007 WL 2080419 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007) 
(declining to order sanctions since defendant was not on notice that it should 
retain the requested server log data), aff’d, 245 F.R.D. 443 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
 111. Phillip M. Adams & Assoc., L.L.C. v. Dell, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 
1193 (D. Utah 2009). 
 112. Lewy v. Remington Arms, 836 F.2d 1104, 1113 (8th Cir. 1988); 
Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 76 (D. Mass. 1976). 
 113. See, e.g., Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1112 (explaining that a reasonable 
retention policy would keep records of customer complaints longer than other 
records); Kozlowski, 73 F.R.D. at 76–77 (holding that defendant’s policy of 
indexing customer complaints was so byzantine and obstructionist that it 
precluded the retrieval of relevant documents). 
 114. Adam Cohen, Angst Over Data Retention Ruling May Be Misplaced: 
‘Adams’ Actually Was in Line with Legal Precedent and Evolving Best 
Practices at U.S. Corporations, 31 NAT’L L.J. 51 (2009). 
 115. Phillip M. Adams, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1191, 1195. 
 116. Id. at 1192. 
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practices.117 For example, the server hosting the defendants’ e-
mail was programmed to automatically delete all mail not 
manually archived by employees.118 Such an arbitrary policy—
entirely reliant on the discretion of individual employees—
apparently suited the defendants’ business model given the 
limited storage capacity on their servers.119 Such a narrowly 
tailored policy was unreasonable: 
A court—and more importantly, a litigant—is not required to simply 
accept whatever information management practices a party may 
have. A practice may be unreasonable, given responsibilities to third 
parties. While a party may design its information management 
practices to suit its business purposes, one of those business purposes 
must be accountability to third parties.120 
The defendants’ parochial retention practices did not 
account for the duties they owed to third parties in connection 
with litigation.121 This practice ultimately negated any 
possibility that the Safe Harbor could apply.122 
Phillip M. Adams is a watershed case for records 
management. Organizations that fail to implement reasonable 
retention policies or that narrowly customize them to limit 
expense or exposure to liability may run afoul of this decision. 
By focusing only on reducing operating expenses, companies 
may cause the opposite result to occur. Organizations may 
exponentially increase their bottom line by failing to factor in 
legal considerations to third parties. 
B.  THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY—EXAMPLES OF 
REASONABLE AND UNREASONABLE RECORDS MANAGEMENT 
POLICIES 
The difference between a reasonable and unreasonable 
document retention policy can make all the difference for an 
organization when it comes to maximizing revenues and 
minimizing operation expenses.123 As evidenced by the 
judiciary’s application of Rule 37(e), that distinction is equally 
applicable in legal proceedings. In litigation, sanctions are less 
                                                          
 117. Id. at 1193. 
 118. Id. at 1181–82, 1192. 
 119. Id. at 1181–82. 
 120. Id. at 1193 (emphasis added). 
 121. Id. at 1192–94. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See PUBLIC HEARING, supra note 8, at 369. 
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frequently imposed on organizations that develop and follow a 
reasonable policy. In those instances involving a “bad” policy, or 
where there is no policy at all, data destruction typically 
prevents application of the Safe Harbor. The cases of Gippetti v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc.,124 Connor v. Sun Trust Bank,125 and 
Keithley v. Home Store.com, Inc.126 exemplify these trends in 
post-Rule 37(e) case law. 
1. The GoodGippetti v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 
One of the general hallmarks of an effective records 
management policy is that it addresses the particular needs of 
an organization while balancing them against litigation 
imperatives.127 This point is well illustrated in Gippetti v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc.128 In Gippetti, the court refused to 
sanction defendant United Parcel Service (“UPS”) for allowing 
copies of electronic tachograph records to be overwritten 
pursuant to its document retention policy.129 Plaintiff, a 
terminated delivery truck driver,130 argued that UPS should be 
sanctioned for allowing destruction of the tachograph 
records.131 Plaintiff asserted that the records, which track a 
vehicle’s speed and movements, would have established his age 
discrimination claim by showing that he drove his delivery 
route at the same rate as other, younger drivers.132 
The court rejected the sanctions request due in significant 
part to the good faith operation of UPS’s computer servers.133 
Developed several years before the instant lawsuit, UPS’s 
“nationwide practice” was to purge tachograph records after 
thirty-seven days to reduce a growing stockpile of data.134 
Another factor favoring UPS was its decision to modify the 
                                                          
 124. Gippetti v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. C07-00812 RMW (HRL), 
2008 WL 3264483 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2008). 
 125. Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 126. Keithley v. Home Store.com, Inc., No. C-03-04447 SI (EDL), 2008 WL 
3833384 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2008). 
 127. See 7 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 37A.56[1] (3d ed. 2009). 
 128. See Gippetti, 2008 WL 3264483, at *2. 
 129. Id. at *4. 
 130. Id. at *1. Plaintiff was discharged for “sleeping on the job” and 
“stealing time” from UPS. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at *4–5. 
 134. Id. at *2. 
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operation of its servers after a preservation duty was triggered 
such that records still in its possession could be produced.135 In 
any event, the records were held to have little if any relevance 
to the plaintiff’s claims.136 What information, if any, the 
plaintiff needed from the records could be gleaned from time 
cards produced by UPS.137 
Gippetti provides a favorable benchmark against which 
organizations can analyze their retentions practices. The 
reasonableness of the policy at issue was measured by its good 
faith business purpose, the length of time it had been in place, 
that it was actually followed,138 and that the destruction of 
records occurred before a preservation duty attached.139 The 
policy was also effective since it eliminated one source of 
information while maintaining another, equally viable source 
that could be used in litigation.140 Finally, promptly modifying 
the policy to retain the requested records after the preservation 
duty was triggered eliminated any doubt regarding UPS’s good 
faith under Rule 37(e).141 
2. The BadConnor v. Sun Trust Bank 
In contrast to Gippetti stands the problematic retention 
policy in Connor v. Sun Trust Bank.142 Pursuant to that 
retention policy, the defendant bank’s server purged all e-mail 
more than thirty days old that had not been manually archived 
outside the company’s e-mail system.143 That policy, coupled 
with a companion practice of overwriting back-up tapes after 
ten days, ensured that any e-mail that a bank employee 
neglected to archive would be automatically deleted after forty 
days.144 
Such retention practices proved inadequate in Connor. A 
                                                          
 135. Id. at *1. 
 136. Id. at *4. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372, 378 (D. Conn. 2007) 
(issuing sanctions for, among other reasons, the defendant’s failure to follow 
its document retention policies). 
 139. Gippetti, 2008 WL 3264483, at *2–4. 
 140. Id. at *4. 
 141. Id. at *2. 
 142. Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1367 (N.D. Cal. 
2008). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
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negative inference instruction was imposed on the bank for 
failing to preserve a key e-mail relating to the plaintiff’s Family 
and Medical Leave Act claim.145 Through its general counsel, 
the bank issued a timely litigation hold and instructed its 
employees most likely to have data relevant to the lawsuit to 
preserve that information.146 Nevertheless, the bank employee 
responsible for discharging plaintiff did not preserve any e-
mails during a crucial six-week period, including the key e-mail 
at issue.147 Though it was never established whether the e-mail 
was intentionally deleted or simply wiped out by the bank’s e-
mail server, this fact was irrelevant.148 The e-mail was deleted 
in contravention of the company’s preservation instructions.149 
Worse, it created an inference that other potentially relevant e-
mails were also deleted.150 
The Connor holding is instructive on multiple fronts. Like 
the defendants in Phillip M. Adams,151 the bank unreasonably 
relied on its employees to determine what e-mails should or 
should not have been kept.152 The drawback to such an 
approach is that employees may neglect to archive (or 
consciously discard) their e-mails or other data.153 That is 
precisely what occurred with the bank employee who 
terminated plaintiff.154 A reasonable policy would have 
addressed this issue by retaining e-mails, back-up tapes or both 
for a longer period of time. 
Regardless, the bank should have modified its e-mail and 
back-up tape retention policies as part of its litigation hold.155 
Had it done so, the deleted e-mails likely would not have 
slipped through the cracks.156 By failing to do so, the bank 
                                                          
 145. Id. at 1376–77. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 1367–68. 
 150. Id. at 1376. 
 151. Phillip M. Adams & Assoc., L.L.C. v. Dell, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1173 
(D. Utah 2009). 
 152. Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1367–68. 
 153. Id. at 1368. 
 154. Id. (noting that the employee in question fell behind in archiving her 
e-mails). 
 155. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note (2006 Amendment). 
 156. See Gippetti v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. C07-00812 RMW (HRL), 
2008 WL 3264483, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2008). 
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could not establish that the routine operation of its server was 
in good faith.157 
3.  The UglyKeithley v. Home Store.com 
Standing apart from the “good” and “bad” examples of 
records management are those “ugly” situations where 
organizations fail to even implement a document retention 
policy.158 This neglect can be disastrous in litigation and 
generally leaves organizations outside the protections of the 
Safe Harbor.159 The Keithley v. Home Store.com, Inc. decision 
exemplifies this scenario.160 
In Keithley, the court leveled monetary and evidentiary 
sanctions against the defendants for their destruction of 
relevant source code and related evidence.161 The evidence 
destruction was tracked back to the defendants’ failure to 
implement a document retention policy or even issue a 
litigation hold.162 Such conduct, which was per se “reckless” 
and “intentional,” placed the defendants far beyond the Safe 
Harbor’s refuge.163 
Surprisingly enough, Keithley is not an isolated 
occurrence.164 In the recent decision of Technical Sales 
Associates, Inc. v. Ohio Star Forge Co., the defendant did not 
have an e-mail retention policy, never implemented a litigation 
hold, and intentionally destroyed categories of evidence.165 The 
                                                          
 157. Though Rule 37(e) is not specifically mentioned in the opinion, the 
analysis is paradigmatic for understanding the application of the Safe Harbor. 
See also United Med. Supply Co. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 257, 274 (2007) 
(sanctioning defendant for allowing materials to be destroyed by its 
“antiquated” retention policies and reasoning that policies involving contract 
materials should, at a minimum, require retention of such materials during 
the applicable statute of limitations). 
 158. Keithley v. Home Store.com, Inc., No. C-03-04447 SI (EDL), 2008 WL 
3833384 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2008). 
 159. Technical Sales Assoc., Inc. v. Ohio Star Forge Co., Nos. 07-11745, 08-
13365, 2009 WL 728520, at *6–8 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 19, 2009). 
 160. Keithley, 2008 WL 3833384, at *6, *16. 
 161. Id. at *18, *20 (noting that defendants’ misconduct was “among the 
most egregious this Court has seen”). 
 162. Id. at *6, *16. 
 163. Id. at *16 (finding that defendants’ false statements and eleventh 
hour productions also factored into the court’s holding). 
 164. Technical Sales, 2009 WL 728520, at *6–8. 
 165. Id. 
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Safe Harbor was therefore not applicable.166 
4.  Reasonable Retention Policies Can Effectively Address 
Organizational Needs in Relation to Litigation Requirements 
The simple lesson from the Safe Harbor case law is that 
there is no magic formula for a reasonable and effective 
retention policy. Instead, it must take into account an 
organization’s business needs, which include particularized 
legal demands.167 That is how a thirty-seven day retention 
practice in Gippetti was held to be reasonable168 while a 
combined forty day policy in Connor was not.169 In those 
instances where a policy was inadequate, such as in Connor, it 
was because the organization did not properly assess the 
impact of litigation on its business.170 Simply put, a policy must 
be reasonable under the circumstances. 
C.  MODIFYING RECORDS MANAGEMENT POLICIES: TIMING AND 
SCOPE ARE EVERYTHING 
Timing is everything when it comes to knowing when to 
modify a document retention policy. But timing is not all; an 
understanding of the breadth of what needs to be preserved is 
also required. By correctly assessing when a preservation duty 
is triggered and then reasonably limiting the appropriate scope 
of material that is included as part of that preservation duty, 
litigants can establish the reasonableness of their conduct in 
litigation. At the same time, organizations can keep the wheels 
turning on their servers such that superfluous data continue to 
be overwritten. Most cases addressing Rule 37(e) have in some 
form or another touched on the issue of modifying or 
suspending a litigant’s records management policy. Of those 
cases, the following spotlight the nuances that parties may 
need to address when considering whether to modify such a 
policy. 
                                                          
 166. Id. 
 167. Phillip M. Adams & Assoc., L.L.C. v. Dell, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 
1193 (D. Utah 2009). 
 168. Gippetti v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. C07-00812 RMW (HRL), 
2008 WL 3264483, at *1−4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2008). 
 169. Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1376–77 (N.D. Cal. 
2008). 
 170. See Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1368; see also United Med. Supply Co. 
v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 257, 274 (2007). 
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1.  Whether and What Aspects of a Retention Policy Require 
Modification 
The first inquiry a litigant must consider is whether any 
aspect of its document management practices requires 
modification. As a rule, parties need not interrupt a policy if 
they do not know or are not reasonably aware that data 
encompassed by that policy should be preserved.171 The 
Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & 
Frailey decision is instructive on this issue.172 
In Healthcare Advocates, the court refused to sanction the 
defendant for allowing its computers to automatically delete 
internet cache files that the plaintiff argued were relevant to 
its claims.173 Despite ongoing litigation, no preservation duty 
for the files attached such that it would have been reasonable 
for the defendant to have retained the files.174 In addition, the 
defendant preserved other data in lieu of the cache files that 
had equal relevance to the plaintiff’s claims.175 Nor was there 
any business purpose for keeping the files.176 Accordingly, the 
defendant had no reason to modify its policy of allowing the 
files to be automatically deleted.177 
A more subtle distinction appears when an organization 
knows a preservation duty has been triggered, yet chooses to 
allow a retention policy to continue uninterrupted.178 For 
instance, the defendant in Escobar v. City of Houston did not 
modify a records management policy that caused e-mail and 
                                                          
 171. Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey, 497 
F. Supp. 2d 627, 640–41 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 641. 
 174. Id. at 640–41; see also Mohrmeyer v. Wal-Mart Stores East, No. 09-69-
WOB, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 20, 2009) (applying Rule 37(e) to hold that 
sanctions were not justified for the defendant’s destruction of a paper record). 
 175. Id. at 641. 
 176. Id. at 639 (noting that the defendant had no marketing or advertising 
purpose for the disputed information). 
 177. This holding is consistent with the results of other cases decided 
under Rule 37(e). See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-
1093FMCJCX, 2007 WL 2080419, at *13–14 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007), aff’d, 
245 F.R.D. 443 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 
223 F.R.D. 162, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that under the prior draft version 
of Rule 37(e), defendant should not be sanctioned for failing to retain data 
automatically purged by the ordinary operation of a computer system). 
 178. Escobar v. City of Houston, No. 04-1945, 2007 WL 2900581 (S.D. Tex. 
Sept. 29, 2007). 
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other electronic communications to be deleted after ninety 
days.179 Knowing that the police officers involved in a shooting 
that led to the plaintiff’s wrongful death suit did not use e-mail, 
the defendant did not stop a server from deleting e-mail 
contemporaneous with the shooting.180 Instead, the defendant 
preserved other records that it believed would be more relevant 
to the plaintiff’s claim.181 As that conduct was found to be 
reasonable, plaintiff’s sanctions request was denied.182 
In contrast to Escobar, courts typically refuse to apply Rule 
37(e)’s Safe Harbor when a party allows a retention policy to 
destroy the only sources of relevant data. For example, in 
Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., monetary 
sanctions were appropriate to address the defendants’ failure to 
preserve archival back-up tapes.183 The tapes contained the 
only source of data formerly found on the computers of the 
defendants’ employees.184 Similarly, a court issued monetary 
and evidentiary sanctions in Doe v. Norwalk Community 
College to address the loss of key data when back-up tapes were 
allowed to be overwritten.185 And in Pandora Jewelry, LLC v. 
Chamilia, LLC, monetary sanctions were ordered as a result of 
the defendant’s failure to prevent relevant e-mails from being 
deleted after ninety days.186 
2. Harmonizing Retention Practices and Litigation 
Imperatives Requires an Effective Management Team 
Just as the reasonableness of a records management 
practice depends on a given set of facts, so too there is no bright 
line approach regarding what policies need to be modified to 
ensure that relevant data is retained. As previously discussed, 
it is unnecessary and unwise to suspend all aspects of all 
                                                          
 179. Id. at *18−19. 
 180. Id. at *18. 
 181. Id. at *19. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 
637 (D. Colo. 2007). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372, 378, 381 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 186. Pandora Jewelry, LLC v. Chamilia, LLC, No. CCB-06-3041, 2008 WL 
4533902, at *8−9 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2008); see also Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, 
No. 05-3091 (JBS/JS), slip op. at 4 (D.N.J. Aug. 4, 2009), 2009 WL 2413631 
(finding that no effort was made to keep e-mails that were deleted after a 
preservation duty arose). 
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retention protocols.187 Litigants will simply have to choose how 
much or little information they will keep to comply with a 
preservation obligation.188 Doing nothing, however, is not an 
option.189 Taking action to preserve data may allow an 
organization to use the Safe Harbor to avoid issue, evidence or 
terminating sanctions.190 Organizations must ultimately 
evaluate their respective circumstances and move forward in a 
reasonable fashion. Drawing upon the advice of seasoned 
professionals, including legal counsel, will likely be critical to 
the success of those efforts.191 
IV.  SUGGESTED PRACTICES FOR ADDRESSING 
LITIGATION REQUIREMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH 
RECORDS MANAGEMENT PROTOCOLS 
The developing body of Rule 37(e) jurisprudence provides 
guidance for litigants to implement effective records 
management protocols. This Part contains suggested practices 
for addressing litigation requirements in connection with an 
organization’s retention policies. 
A. TIMELY IMPLEMENT AN EFFECTIVE RETENTION POLICY 
Before anything else can happen, a party must design and 
                                                          
 187. Cache La Poudre Feeds, 244 F.R.D. at 623–24; Healthcare Advocates, 
Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627, 641 (E.D. Pa. 
2007) (holding it was unreasonable for Plaintiff to expect Defendants to 
completely remove computers from further operation to protect against data 
from being lost); Turner v. Resort Condo. Int’l, LLC, No. 1:03-cv-2025-DFH-
WTL, 2006 WL 1990379, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Jul. 13, 2006) (holding that a pre-
litigation demand letter that requested preservation of all company electronic 
data was unreasonably overbroad and did not trigger a duty to preserve all 
such material). 
 188. Cache La Poudre Feeds, 244 F.R.D. at 623. 
 189. See Oklahoma, ex rel. Edmondson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 05-CV-329-
GKF-SAJ, 2007 WL 1498973, at *6 (N.D. Okla. May 17, 2007) (urging the 
parties to use the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) conference to address 
issues relating to electronically stored information and warning them to “be 
very cautious in relying upon any ‘safe harbor’ doctrine as described in new 
Rule 37[e]”); cases cited supra Part III.C.1. 
 190. See Cache La Poudre Feeds, 244 F.R.D. at 635–36. But see Connor v. 
Sun Trust Bank, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that adverse 
inference instruction was appropriate sanction even though defendant took 
some reasonable steps to preserve certain evidence). 
 191. See Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1367 n.2 (recognizing counsel’s efforts 
to preserve relevant data); Cache La Poudre Feeds, 244 F.R.D. at 629–30 
(noting steps counsel could have taken to prevent data from being lost). 
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implement a records retention policy.192 Without such a policy, 
an organization may be exposed to a host of problems.193 Its 
servers could be adversely affected by an unnecessary build-up 
of e-mail, spam and viruses.194 What is more, a company’s 
failure to have such a policy in place has been held to be grossly 
negligent when relevant data is lost.195 Organizations that fail 
to implement such policies will likely increase the cost of their 
operations.196 
B. PREPARE FOR LAWSUITS IN ADVANCE OF ACTUAL LITIGATION 
Litigation will happen—or at least organizations should 
act like it will.197 Parties can prepare an internal process for 
how they will address issues relating to document retention 
before any additional lawsuits are filed.198 This should 
undoubtedly include whether and when a retention practice 
should be modified.199 It could also include designating a 
litigation response team among company personnel.200 In 
addition, criteria should be prepared to assess the likelihood of 
future litigation and the company’s anticipated response.201 
C. CLOSELY FOLLOW RECORDS MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
Once in place, a document retention policy should be 
followed in the ordinary course of business. The reasonableness 
and effectiveness of a policy will likely be evaluated by how 
faithful an organization has been to the designated 
                                                          
 192. Allman, supra note 54, at 16. 
 193. See PUBLIC HEARING, supra note 8, at 369. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372, 379–80 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 196. This accords with one of the law’s sacred maxims: “The law helps 
those who help themselves, generally aids the vigilant, but rarely the sleeping, 
and never the acquiescent.” Hannan v. Dusch, 153 S.E. 824, 831 (Va. 1930). 
 197. See 2007 SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 105, at 30; SEDONA 
CONFERENCE COMMENTARY ON LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 105, at 8. 
 198. See Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Special Masters and 
E-Discovery: The Intersection of Two Recent Revisions to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 347, 369 (2008); 2007 SEDONA 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 105, at 30. 
 199. Cf. Scheindlin & Redgrave, supra note 198, at 369 (raising the 
questions Rule 37(e) poses regarding what actions parties need to take to 
protect themselves from sanctions). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
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procedure.202 A company that does not follow its retention 
practices closely may find it difficult to invoke the Safe Harbor 
and stave off discovery sanctions.203 Indeed, the defendants in 
Doe v. Norwalk Community College could not find shelter in the 
Safe Harbor due in part to their failure to follow their own 
retention policies.204 
D. DO NOT EXCLUSIVELY RELY ON THE SAFE HARBOR FOR 
PROTECTION 
Despite the protection the Safe Harbor may afford, parties 
should be realistic about the nature of its application. If a 
retention practice is not reasonable, is not effective, has not 
been followed, or is otherwise questionable, a litigant should 
not expect to be bailed out by Rule 37(e).205 To avoid that 
scenario, an organization can follow, among other things, the 
guidelines delineated by pertinent case law in Part Three 
regarding the aspects of a reasonable retention policy.206 
V. CONCLUSION 
The law governing records management practices under 
Rule 37(e) is beginning to take shape. Valuable insight and 
much needed guidance are being provided to litigants about 
how to manage electronic data in conjunction with litigation 
demands. As the Safe Harbor is further construed and 
interpreted, case law will evolve and better guide litigants in 
their efforts to preserve data when required, while also 
reducing operating expenses. This ongoing development of the 
Safe Harbor should help fulfill the vision of making litigation 
requirements, business practices, and best practices one and 
the same.207 
 
                                                          
 202. See Gippetti v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. C07-00812 RMW (HRL), 
2008 WL 3264483, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2008). 
 203. Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372, 378 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 204. Id. (holding that retention practices were not “routine” within the 
meaning of Rule 37(e)). 
 205. See supra Part III. 
 206. Id. 
 207. PUBLIC HEARING, supra note 8, at 381. 
